Unless it has some kind of body temperature control, there are gonna be a lot of heat strokes in that suit when combined with molly.
I ignored the paragraph I wrote? What are you talking about? My state order that permitted non-essential businesses to begin reopening specifically forbid churches to participate regardless of occupancy size. I’d agree that a general mandate against X amount of people or one requiring that people remain Y feet apart that’s applicable to every gathering would be much more constitutionally sound. Which is what I said.
Anyone following this story? News breaks that the Chief aid for Boris Johnson, who also had coronavirus, broke their lockdown orders and drove completely across the country to his parents house. They had an actual lockdown and this was not allowed. He claims he went to find someone to look after his 4 year old since him and his wife had the virus. No one really bought that argument since he has a lot of family in London but a lot of the cabinet defended him aggressively. The newspapers held back the fact that he made a second trip and dropped that info after the cabinet spent the day defending him. That’s some fantastic journalism.
That’s actually a cordon case not a quarantine case, and we could go back and forth on the applicability of those historic cases to the circumstances at hand, but I don’t think that’s necessary. I agree that a neutral law of general applicability doesn’t raise a free exercise issue. I wrote exactly that in the post you quoted. In my state, non-essential retail was the first to open provided they required masks, limited occupancy, and enforced 6-foot distance requirements to be enforced. All in-person religious services were explicitly suspended without regard to occupancy or distance guidelines. Currently, one county has received provisional approval from the Governor for an exemption to that rule to allow for services that follow the social distance guidelines, but the order on the books does not permit it, nor have the other counties (all of which have fewer active cases) received the exemption.
I agree that it’s more problematic, but I don’t think they’re out of the generally applicable law scenario - the businesses and venues are closed on a risk-based methodology that treats all gathering spaces, including churches, the same. It’s basically the same as the California order, which the 9th Circuit upheld yesterday, and more restrictive than most state orders the CDC guidance is trying to influence.
If you want to quibble over my use of quarantine rather than cordon, go ahead. That is a fool’s argument as it doesn’t change the fact that a case was adjudicated in our federal court system all the way to the SCOTUS which found that state governments have the police power to keep healthy people away from areas where diseases are known to be in order to prevent spread. I also like how we can just forget about stare decisis because those cases happened along time ago and now don’t fit into your idea of what our laws are or should be. I also like how you skirted the issue that what was discussed on that tweet is in fact a 10th amendment issue, which in your ignorance you said it wasn’t, and that should Trump intercede in any way other than challenging things through the federal courts it would be a far greater destruction to our federal system and that would be a far greater threat to our way of life in the US. Get fucked dumbass.
You are deliberately misreading what I wrote and ignoring the fact that there are multiple state governors crafting orders which directly invoke a free exercise issue. For like the fifth time, I agree that a neutral law of general applicability would not infringe on the first amendment and would fall under the states’ tenth amendment power to protect the public health. That is not what is happening everywhere; however, I just gave you a concrete example of it.
Interesting. Do you have a link to that decision? I can’t find it and would love to read it. How do you think the situation I described is a generally applicable law that treats businesses and churches the same? It explicitly allows non-essential businesses to open using social distancing guidelines but prohibits churches from doing so. For some more context, the first non-essential business the governor approved was the largest shopping mall in the state.
I am not misreading, I am telling you you are wrong. It doesn’t matter how many times you write it, it doesn’t help your argument that the tweet is wrong. This is a 10th amendment issue first and foremost for a few reasons. Your position that free association guaranteed to individuals under the 1st amendment in the federal constitution is being infringed upon by laws enacted by states would need to be challenged in the federal court system and any decision will have to consider whether the states are acting legitimately within the 10th amendment. So, again this will always be a 10th amendment issue. Again, you can argue that this isn’t JUST a 10th amendment issue, as courts may decide to apply a balancing of interests between the 1st and 10th amendment. But again because there is settled law which gives broad power in emergency situations to promote health and safety, I believe any balance would fall to the side of the 10th in this matter. Now here’s the biggie. Should Trump mean by “overriding” his intention on interfering in any way other than instructing the DOJ to challenge the laws in court, then you have a big 10th amendment power struggle between the federal government and the states, of which Trump is on the wrong side. Now to avoid clogging this thread on this. Again, get fucked. I’m done.
do we really have to go over the unique nature of churches that makes them more comparable to in door restaurants than things like malls setting aside the lawyer session, it's not an apples to apples comp
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/05/22/20-55533_order.pdf I don’t think the CA or HI orders treat businesses and churches the same, they treat churches as places of gathering which are considered higher risk than the businesses/retail which were authorized to open. If they did treat them as a business, I can’t see how they would keep them closed without possibility of operating consistent with social distancing guidelines, while opening businesses with social distancing guidelines.
It also doesn't change that any challenges to state orders have to come through the judicial branch because fuckhead Trump has no standing to "override" jack shit.
FWIW, the governor here is also planning to allow in door restaurants to open June 5 statewide but does not to-date have any similar plan for churches.
Quit being so melodramatic. Setting aside the Trump issue for a second, as you allude the DOJ routinely issues advisory memos directing the states to take or refrain from certain actions in accordance of the Fed’s interpretation of the law. On well-settled issues, the Fed occasionally takes direct action without first applying for injunctive or declaratory relief through the courts, Eisenhower desegregating the Arkansas public schools being the most famous example. I think your take on the balancing test is colored by your desire to argue w me on this. Any restriction of free exercise is going to receive strict scrutiny. The gov’t obviously has a compelling state interest, but I fail to see how it’s narrowly tailored and the least restrictive when they can just as easily allow churches to operate under the same distancing guidelines as everything else, limit occupancy, hold outdoor services, etc...
Ah I see what you’re saying. Yeah I don’t see that distinction surviving further review. Keep in mind the 9th gets overturned more than any other court, and the majority opinion doesn’t even attempt to conduct any sort of balancing test: Collins eviscerates it in the dissent.
At this point, if you choose to go to these places it’s on you. Malls, salons, restaurants, etc. Tattoo these people with DNI/DNR.
Both liberal and conservative supreme courts have regularly ruled in favor of the churches on free exercise challenges. The major instances where they went the other way were the polygamy and drug cases.
I guess I’m not done. So you’re going to conveniently leave out that Eisenhower was enforcing a decision of the SCOTUS to end segregation, not acting on his own or on the advisory opinions of his DOJ? You also mentioned that this would certainly get strict scrutiny because it involves free exercise, but that’s not always true. In the peyote case you mentioned earlier, they didn't use strict scrutiny. In fact, here is what Scalia said in the opinion, Respondents argue that even though exemption from generally applicable criminal laws need not automatically be extended to religiously motivated actors, at least the claim for a religious exemption must be evaluated under the balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). Under the Sherbert test, governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. See id., at 402-403, 83 S.Ct., at 1792-1794; see also Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S., at 699, 109 S.Ct., at 2148. Applying that test we have, on three occasions, invalidated state unemployment compensation rules that conditioned the availability of benefits upon an applicant's willingness to work under conditions forbidden by his religion. See Sherbert v. Verner, supra; Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987). We have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation. Although we have sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than that, we have always found the test satisfied, see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 91 S.Ct. 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971). In recent years we have abstained from applying the Sherbert test (outside the unemployment compensation field) at all. In Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986), we declined to apply Sherbert analysis to a federal statutory scheme that required benefit applicants and recipients to provide their Social Security numbers. The plaintiffs in that case asserted that it would violate their religious beliefs to obtain and provide a Social Security number for their daughter. We held the statute's application to the plaintiffs valid regardless of whether it was necessary to effectuate a compelling interest. See 476 U.S., at 699-701, 106 S.Ct., at 2151-53. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988), we declined to apply Sherbert analysis to the Government's logging and road construction activities on lands used for religious purposes by several Native American Tribes, even though it was undisputed that the activities "could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices," 485 U.S., at 451, 108 S.Ct., at 1326. In Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 106 S.Ct. 1310, 89 L.Ed.2d 478 (1986), we rejected application of the Sherbert test to military dress regulations that forbade the wearing of yarmulkes. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), we sustained, without mentioning the Sherbert test, a prison's refusal to excuse inmates from work requirements to attend worship services. 18 Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law. The Sherbert test, it must be recalled, was developed in a context that lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct. As a plurality of the Court noted in Roy, a distinctive feature of unemployment compensation programs is that their eligibility criteria invite consideration of the particular circumstances behind an applicant's unemployment: "The statutory conditions [in Sherbert and Thomas ] provided that a person was not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits if, 'without good cause,' he had quit work or refused available work. The 'good cause' standard created a mechanism for individualized exemptions." Bowen v. Roy, supra, 476 U.S., at 708, 106 S.Ct., at 2156 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by Powell and REHNQUIST, JJ.). See also Sherbert, supra, 374 U.S., at 401, n. 4, 83 S.Ct., at 1792, n. 4 (reading state unemployment compensation law as allowing benefits for unemployment caused by at least some "personal reasons"). As the plurality pointed out in Roy, our decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of "religious hardship" without compelling reason. Bowen v. Roy, supra, 476 U.S., at 708, 106 S.Ct., at 2156-57. 19 Whether or not the decisions are that limited, they at least have nothing to do with an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct. Although, as noted earlier, we have sometimes used the Sherbert test to analyze free exercise challenges to such laws, see United States v. Lee, supra, 455 U.S., at 257-260, 102 S.Ct., at 1055-1057; Gillette v. United States, supra, 401 U.S., at 462, 91 S.Ct., at 842-43, we have never applied the test to invalidate one. We conclude today that the sounder approach, and the approach in accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the test inapplicable to such challenges. The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, "cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development." Lyng, supra, 485 U.S., at 451, 108 S.Ct., at 1326. To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is "compelling"—permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law unto himself," Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S., at 167—contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.2 20 The "compelling government interest" requirement seems benign, because it is familiar from other fields. But using it as the standard that must be met before the government may accord different treatment on the basis of race, see, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1881-82, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984), or before the government may regulate the content of speech, see, e.g., Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 2836, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989), is not remotely comparable to using it for the purpose asserted here. What it produces in those other fields—equality of treatment and an unrestricted flow of contending speech—are constitutional norms; what it would produce here—a private right to ignore generally applicable laws—is a constitutional anomaly.3
They didn’t use strict scrutiny because the law was generally applicable to every last citizen in the state. It didn’t delineate classes of people allowed to use peyote and those that weren’t. It didn’t permit businesses to offer peyote while prohibiting churches from doing so. When laws that aren’t generally applicable to everyone infringe on religious exercise, they receive strict scrutiny. Yes, Eisenhower had a recent supreme case directly on point to rely on. It was a different situation, totally agree. I mentioned it only because it was the most famous example of direct action. FWIW I sincerely doubt Trump will send in the national guard to open churches, but if he did I certainly wouldn’t agree with that tactic. All I’m saying is that several of the governor’s orders have provisions that are flagrantly disregarding the first amendment, and I don’t have an issue, in theory, with the executive indirectly pressuring them to fix the problems, even if I disagree with just about everything Trump has done WRT the pandemic response.
It is pretty sadistic but I cannot wait to see what happens to the numbers in the next week or two. How could they not skyrocket?